Graham Potter Tactical Analysis: What Brighton Blueprint Tells Us About His Potential Chelsea Rebuild.

The 47-year-old was signed within days of Thomas Tuchel's shock departure, amid major interest from clubs and national team(s). What charms does Potter have up his sleeve for the Chelsea faithful?

In a year full of turbulent seas that threatened to wreck the ship, Thomas Tuchel was the anchor that held everything steady until the skies cleared and the seas calmed. But in the months after, when gales had dissipated into sweet, summer breezes, the anchor stayed firm, insistent that it was doing just what it was designed to do. So even as the winds of change began to blow gently at the sails, the ship stayed stagnant as the world around it moved ahead. The anchor was swiftly removed by those on the ship; the thought here being perhaps that things that sometimes help us hold firm can sometimes become ones that weigh us down.

Graham Potter now takes charge of a vessel that would make him the envy of captains aplenty. But the 47-year-old from Solihull also has the unenviable task of stepping into the rather daunting shadow of his predecessor’s legacy, from where he must navigate into uncharted territory. But considering a decade’s worth of experience which took him from playing as a leftback at Birmingham City, via a university coach in the ninth division of English football to the very first tier, Potter seems more than ready to take his place at the helm. Here’s an in-depth breakdown of Potter’s tactics and managerial philosophy at Brighton, and why the Chelsea hierarchy consider him as the right figure to steer Chelsea into a new era.

Build Up

Let us start with the building blocks. At Brighton, Potter varied his build up depending on the opposition’s intent. A 3+1 or 3+2 build-up had 3 CBs with Lallana functioning as the deep-lying orchestrator last season, although this season Alexis Mac Allister has taken on those duties. The 3 CBs spread out wide and form a diamond with the CM/DM at the base, and the wingbacks stay close to the touchline to offer routes around central pressure. The 2nd (or 3rd) midfielder does not participate too often in buildup, choosing to hold a slightly higher position than his midfield partner so as to be able to progress play with quick carries and short passes, or fall back to defend any transition.

At other times, Brighton make a 3 with goalkeeper Robert Sanchez at the base of the build-up diamond, with one of the wide CBs pushing into a more progressive position. This allows the corresponding WB to take up a more advanced position up the pitch, pinning the opposition FB and offering a direct route into the attacking 3rd. Sanchez’s proficiency with the ball at his feet is key to this, and Chelsea’s keeper will be asked to take on a similar level of risk and responsibility in the build-up phase. A comprehensive piece on Brighton’s build up, can be found here.

The one major difference between Brighton and Chelsea’s build ups is the use of long balls and launched goal-kicks. Last season, Brighton’s keepers launched 626 passes, more than twice that of Chelsea’s 287. They also launched 68.6% of their goal-kicks, compared to just 33% by Chelsea. Brighton’s long passing as a whole was more frequent (101.9/4th in the league) than Chelsea’s (92.8/11th.) Brighton’s launched pass (more than 40 yards) completion% of 31.9% was the worst in the league last season; at 28.6% they’re third from bottom this season. So why do they do it?

This ploy serves multiple purposes. The first is that a launched goal-kick allows Brighton to bypass the def-3rd build up phase and push straight into a mid-3rd/att 3rd structure to win the ball. In terms of passes per defensive actions (ppda), Brighton were again 4th with 9.37 last season, one below Chelsea at 8.76. Their hard working forwards and the mobility and aggression of their central midfielders (Mwepu, Mcallister, Caicedo) allows them to press effectively, often leading to ball wins in advantageous positions. Brighton’s 3-man defense is also impressive at winning 2nd balls in the ground or in the air, allowing them to pile on more pressure from botched clearances by the opposition. In this sense, Brighton treat goal kicks as disruptive acts that create ripples in an organized structure that can be capitalized upon. You can see here how the immediate aftermath of a goal-kick gifts Brighton an opening. Sanchez often targets Welbeck with these kicks (as he offers good hold-up play) or even attackers in the half-spaces from where the WBs can also offer counter-pressing.

The second is for the rather simple reason of utilizing a more direct route into the attacking third, in scenarios like the one mentioned in which the WB (or even the wide CB) push into an advanced position. All of Brighton’s CBs are adept at hitting accurate long balls, even under pressure.

Attacking Set-Up

The third reason for Brighton’s slick use of long balls moves us smoothly into Potter’s attacking philosophy. Frequently switching play is crucial to the working of a formation with wingbacks, especially against back fours. The CBs, the CM/DM and even the WBs are all switched on to using long diagonals to the wingback/AM/CF on the opposing flank, allowing them a 1v1 opportunity in and around the box. Last season, Brighton hit 570 switches, the 4th highest tally in the league. Chelsea, while playing the same systems, managed only 455, a lowly 15th in the PL.

In attack, Brighton take up many shapes, again varying from opposition to opposition, sometimes from sequence to sequence. A 2-3-5, 3-2-5 and a 2-4-4/4-2-4 are not uncommon, while more adventurous shapes occur when they are trying to overcome a deficit.

Affinity for Width

Brighton like progressing play and attacking via the flanks, which is unsurprising for a side that plays with wingbacks. Last season, Chelsea put in the 4th most crosses in the league (496.) Brighton were, yet again, one behind (485.) Interestingly, Brighton were 6th for crosses completed into the penalty area, while Chelsea were 12th. The WBs and the AMs, quite like in a 4-4-2, were required to develop a healthy dynamic and positional understanding in order to get into good crossing positions. The cutback zone close to the 18-yard-box is valued highly, but if not accessible, deep crosses were used too.

Midfield Balance

The foundation of Brighton’s strong midfield is down to smart recruitment, smarter player profiling from Potter and excellent balance between playing profiles. Last season, the presence of a defensive-minded enforcer in Yves Bissouma allowed Potter to maintain balance even in a 3-4-2-1/3-4-1-2’s midfield two, in which Bissouma’s midfield partner was free to take on more adventurous duties. Bissouma’s departure for Tottenham has led to a slight re-shuffle, with Alexis Mac Allister being reinvented as a 6, paired next to the dynamic, box-to-box profile of Moises Caicedo in a two, or as part of a midfield trio with Caicedo, Pascal Groß, Enock Mwepu or Adam Lallana providing various tactical options.

Another player who hit new strides under Potter was Leandro Trossard, who has been devastating as a WB. Since last season, Brighton have used inverted WBs, with the left-footed Solly March on the right and the right-footed Trossard on the left. With Cucurella at wide CB often given license to venture forward, Trossard would often find himself in the half-space, with time and space to make his decisions. Here for instance, he is able to arrive undetected at the edge of the box, with a better angle for a shot than a conventional WB would have had on his stronger foot.

The inverted position also allows him better angles for passes in behind opposition backlines. These passes, combined with Welbeck’s excellent movement in-behind, are one of Brighton’s weapons in attack.

March’s role as a WB is more prominent off-the-ball. With Brighton preferring to attack through their left, March is afforded the most time and space as the widest receiver in a five man frontline. His duties also involve arriving at the far post for crosses from the left flank, mostly delivered by the other WB. Watch his movements here, as he ghosts in unmarked from wide to inside the box to attack crosses.

Graham Potter admires Pep Guardiola, so it is no surprise to see some aspects of his coaching influenced by the Catalan mastermind. A recurring theme is using triangles and diamonds to overload the flank (usually the left) and snapping play into underloaded areas for midfield runners to latch on to. Here you can see a quick combination on the left is followed by a shift into the center for Mwepu.

Here, Mac Allister is the beneficiary, finding himself with enough time and space to threaten De Gea’s goal.

The Focal Point

The center-forward in Potter’s side tends to play an exhausting all-action role. As mentioned earlier, he tries to engage in first contact for direct deliveries so his side can recover second balls, and chases long balls — a duty more suited to Burnley than a top 6 side.

Potter also urged Maupay/Welbeck to drop, often as deep as the defensive third to participate in build up, offering quick distribution, before attacking the box from deep. Welbeck and Maupay also vacate the center by drifting wide, providing crosses from the flanks for midfield runners.

Welbeck, in particular, performs a largely multi-dimensional and thankless task. He is often the target of long balls out of pressure for Brighton, from where he is expected to hold up the ball, bring midfielders into play or directly lead transitions by running at the defense.

Nearly 32, Welbeck also performs his share of defensive work, pressing aggressively after ball-loses and conserving his energy otherwise by blocking off-passing lanes.

These responsibilities might draw parallels with Kai Havertz, who, despite some excellent industry, hasn’t really scored as many as he should. With Potter preferring to use the long ball in transition far more often than Tuchel ever did, Kai can expect to reprise a role closer to his Leverkusen days — dropping deep to link up play, drifting wide, receiving long balls in behind the opposition defense or arriving late in the center. As long as his finishing improves, his goal tally, hopefully, should blossom a little too.

Positional Rotations

There are some interesting positional rotations too, with Pascal Groß (8/AM) often switching with Solly March at WB. In Potter’s last game vs Leicester, Groß started as the 8 while March was the RWB. But in this instance, March drifts inside for a run into the half-space from WB. Groß(right-sided 8) is wide, has time and sees a 2v2 in the middle and crosses. The other WB, Trossard, collects and crosses to the far post, for March to head in.

Here, against West Ham this season, they are deployed in the same positions. Once again, Groß drifts wide, dragging Rice out, and March slips narrower, almost getting the through-ball.

Here, Mac Allister, playing as the left-sided AM in a 3-4-2-1, drifts wide to allow Trossard to occupy a narrower position inside the box. The layoff is dummied by Caicedo, who has ventured into the box from CM, knowing Bissouma will occupy a deeper position for cover.

Weakness: Chance Creation/Scoring

The weaknesses in attack are eerily similar to the ones Tuchel faced utilizing this system. Last season, Brighton’s top scorer, Trossard, had 7 non-penalty goals, many of them crafted out of individual brilliance (and from wingback.) Their two forwards, Maupay and Welbeck had 7 and 6 respectively. Mac Allister had 3 npGs. Only 5 sides scored less than Brighton last season, and 3 of them were relegated. Leeds barely survived. 42 goals across 38 games was a dismal tally, and the 6th best defense in the league was far more responsible for a 9th placed finish. It was a similar story the season before that, with Brighton scoring only 40, again finishing ahead of only 5 sides, including 3 relegated ones.

It isn’t just goals which were the issue. Creating chances is a major question mark too. Last season’s 49 big chances created placed them level with relegated Watford at tied 9th position. The season before that, they were 11th with 46. Potter inherits those flaws in a similar set up with the Blues, but (with all due respect to Brighton’s excellent players) will have a slightly higher caliber of players to help rectify them.

Defensive Set Up

While in possession, Brighton took up a 3-2, sometimes even a 3-1 defensive unit at the back, with the reliable anti-transition Bissouma guarding his back 3 and Moises Caicedo also providing defensive support as part of his B2B duties. Bissouma offered excellent quantity and quality of defending — he engaged in 5 ground duels on average per game last season, winning an impressive 60% of them. This season, Mac Allister has taken on Bissouma’s role and has done well in the limited sample size. His tenaciousness and aggressive pressing is useful. In terms of quantity and quality, he has coped as well as anyone could have imagined, winning 5.3 ground duels/90. winning 52%.

Out of possession, Potter liked his sides sitting in a back 5, with both WBs slotting deep for defensive duties. The midfield, whether a 2 or 3-man unit, always stayed narrow and compact, preventing central penetration through passes or carries.

This forced Brighton’s opponents to go on the outside for crosses, which Brighton were more than happy to allow. All four of Brighton’s 4 CBs last season figured in the top 50 for aerial duel win%, with Duffy and Webster figuring in the top 4 in the league.

Pressing and Attacking Transitions

Brighton’s mobile, athletic midfield and frontline ensured that possession wins in the attacking and middle 3rd were frequent. Only Liverpool (1702) pressed more often than Brighton (1585) in the attacking 3rd in the league last season. Once the ball was won, the side would pour forward in numbers, aided by willing midfield runners and the wingback on the opposing flank crashing into the box on the blindside. Here vs Leicester for instance, Welbeck is flanked by Mwepu and Caicedo on this transition, which promptly ends in a goal.

In possession, the wide CBs were encouraged to progress the ball out of defense, either by passing, carrying or through adventurous positioning.

Here’s Cucurella venturing forward from LCB to play a key role in one of Brighton’s goals against United last season.

Weakness: Vulnerability to Transitions.

A major caveat for Brighton in recent times has been a susceptibility to transitions, which again, comes as no surprise. Potter’s Brighton were far quicker in build up when compared to Tuchel’s Chelsea. Pep advocates a 12-13 pass build-up rule, ensuring the side has enough rhythm and time to get into a settled shape. Brighton tend to be a lot more vertical, which comes with its rewards, but also poses a serious risk of losing the ball in the middle 3rd, with the side still not in its ideal shape.

The 3+2 and the more volatile 3+1 can also often exploited by clever positioning and smart passes. Here are a few instances where a turnover and a quick pass between lines affords oppositions a 3v3 chance. Such fragility during transitions has also been commonplace at Chelsea, the latest being the last goal conceded under Thomas Tuchel’s reign against Dinamo Zagreb.

Why is Potter a good fit?

Stylistic fit

The strongest argument for Potter’s appointment is the proximity of Chelsea’s current personnel and tactical setup to the one he utilized at Brighton. Thomas Tuchel had made the 3-4-2-1 his default system last year, with a 3-5-2 finding favour at times as well. Potter deployed a 3-4-2-1 against most sides, reserving the 3-5-2 (or a 3-5-1-1) against elite, possession-heavy opposition. Both managers sprung the occasional tactical surprise — Tuchel with a 4-2-2-2 hybrid, while Potter with a 3-box-3, 4-1-4-1 hybrid and more. While the Blues finished 3rd for passes attempted and average possession in the league last season, Brighton were fourth for both. It became clear through the course of last season that Potter was similar to Tuchel in many respects – both manager desire control and are excellent at optimizing a solid structure based on their teams’ strengths, allowing them to build progressive sequences and negate opposition attacks. Whereas Erik Ten Hag has a tough job on his hands to implement a patient, possession-based philosophy at a side where profiles are much more suited to a faster, transition-based approach, Potter’s principles will be familiar to the Chelsea side he inherits, with minor changes that will require far less time to grasp than a jarring change in playing style.

Tactical Versatility

For all their inconsistencies in the league, one thing Tuchel could proudly boast of was Chelsea’s excellent record in knock-out competitions. This was down to many factors - the side itself seemed to shift gears for the big occasions (always a good sign) and partly down to how smartly Tuchel was able to devise specific gameplans to counter sides that did not come to frustrate. The cup record under him has been pretty stellar — a Super Cup, Club World Cup and Champions League, the last of which was achieved by beating arguably the best club team and the best manager in the world. In two Cup finals against Liverpool, Chelsea conceded no goals, and were unlucky to walk away without a trophy after another VAR clanger ruled out a legitimate Lukaku goal.

Potter also displays a similar penchant for tactical surprises, especially against the big hitters. The more obvious changes, like formations to counteract numerical superiority aside, there are more subtle changes, for instance where Sanchez hits his goalkicks, which opposition player’s weakness to exploit and more.

For instance, take a look at how Brighton pressed against Arsenal. Most of the times, they stood off Ramsdale (who has good distribution) and the Arsenal CBs, instead marking off all their nearest options. This forced Arsenal’s CBs into a dilemma - they either had to carry the ball into midfield and risk an aggressive press, or go long to direct options which were being guarded soundly. Brighton would only press when the CB carrier entered a certain zone, otherwise waiting for Arsenal to pass to wide areas, where they had Cedric and Granit Xhaka, a CM.

In this instance, you can see how they lay a clever pressing trap — forcing Arsenal to go wide to the only option (Saka). Cucurella immediately jumps, with Trossard offering the supporting press, like a clamp.

It took Arsenal sometime to navigate out of this mess, with the Emirates crowd regularly booing their CB’s hesitancy to dribble into Brighton’s press. Martinelli eventually had to drop and drift inside from LAM position to progress play.

You can see the difference in the intensity of the press in the attacking 3rd vs in the middle 3rd.

Now take a look at how Brighton pressed vs United in the season’s opener. Knowing De Gea’s poor on-the-ball abilities, this being Lisandro Martinez’s debut and the inability of the double-pivot of Fred-McTominay to function efficiently in the first phase, Brighton pressed high and aggressively.

In this first instance, Brighton lure De Gea into passing to Fred, who is pressed and commits the error. Notice the curved run (to keep Maguire in the cover-shadow) from Groß to press De Gea when triggered by a backpass.

In this second instance, another aggressive press and curved run triggered by the back pass. This time, all near options are marked off, and Groß forces De Gea to utilize his weak on-the-ball skills. The ball goes out of play and Brighton can restart in United’s defensive 3rd.

Bullying Lisandro also paid off as he was caught dawdling on the ball and picked up a yellow in the first half.

In that same game, Potter deployed a 3-box-3, with a double-pivot of Caicedo-Mac Allister and an attacking midfield duo of Groß-Lallana overloading United’s Fred-McTominay double-pivot with a midfield box.

Potter has shown excellent tactical nous for understanding his enemy, laying smart pressing traps and deploying effective countermeasures to blunt their edge. He sometimes changes it up during the game too, which he did recently against Fulham. He noticed Fulham’s AMs were exploiting the gaps between his WBs and the wide CBs, so he quickly shifted to a back 4. Brighton lost that game, but the change helped ease some of the immediate pressure. It is something that will continue to be an asset for Chelsea, especially on the big occasions.

Player Profiling

Potter’s track record of improving players — right from his days managing a university team, through coaching in the Swedish 4th division with Östersunds, to his days at Brighton — has been stellar. His players swear by him; it is clear that a Masters in Emotional Intelligence and his slightly unconventional methods (such as making his team perform the Swan Lake ballet) have got his ideas across really well. Alexis Mac Allister, an industrious number 10, arrived at Brighton in the 19/20 season, but accumulated 2 assists and an abysmal 0.16 xA over two seasons (also down to Brighton’s woeful finishing). He also delivered only 42 key passes in 54 appearances and his average shooting distance was between 20-21 yards, well outside the 18 yard box. This was far from ideal for a number 10.

Post Bissouma’s departure for Spurs, Potter reinvented him as a 6, a move which has paid off spectacularly this season. Not only has the burden of scoring been taken off his shoulders, he is now exerting more influence in the middle of the pitch, his defensive work is helping him and the unit as a whole, and Brighton’s tendency to shift to center from wide overloads allows him a lot more space and time to shoot from distance, which he is very good at. It was excellent coaching and profiling from Potter.

It’s been a similar story with Leandro Trossard, who has improved by leaps and bounds, despite playing in a WB role. Another player who has been profiled magnificently is Pascal Groß. The German midfielder has a great engine, works well in half-spaces and displays a keen intuition when picking up positions. Potter tried him in multiple roles - offering him the chance to be the advanced 8 in a midfield 3, deploying him as the “half-winger” in a 3-4-2-1 where he showcased his playmaking. He has even been played at center-forward. At the time of Potter’s departure, Groß’ role combined a lot of his strengths in these positions, turning him into a chance-creating fulcrum who links up play with deft touches in the attacking 3rd, and scoring important goals.

He has created 5 big chances in 6 games already (he created 6 in all of last season.) Only De Bruyne has more in these six games. He’s already scored one more goal than he did in the entirety of last season, and is only two assists short of matching last season’s tally. Mason Mount comes close in terms of physical and playing profile to Groß, and it will be exciting for both player and manager to see if they can eke out something similar from the England midfielder.

Potter and his staff’s ability to tailor player roles to optimize their effectiveness could be encouraging for a lot of Chelsea players who have had to sacrifice personal preferences for the team’s greater good (there have been many.) Havertz, as mentioned earlier, could find some reprieve in a role more suited to his strengths. A move for Mount from attack to a 6, however, may seem too outlandish, even for Potter (he played Lamptey at CF against Newcastle last season, so you can never be too sure.) But given enough time to appraise his players, there could yet be new roles for Gallagher, Pulisic, Ziyech and even Raheem Sterling. If and how these players respond to his ideas will make for an intriguing case-study a few months down the line.

Conclusion

From the 1st of Jan 2020 to the 20th of July 2020, Brighton won only two league games, losing six and drawing the rest.

From the 26th of September 2020 to the 2nd of Jan 2021, Brighton played 15 PL games. They won only one, lost six and drew the rest.

Between the 6th of January 2021 and and the 25th of April 2021, Brighton played 11 PL games. They won two, lost five and drew the rest.

Between the 28th of September 2021 and the 16th of December 2021, Brighton played 11 PL games. They failed to win a single one; they lost three and drew the rest.

A month later, from 15th of January 2022 to the 2nd of April, Brighton played 11 PL games. They won only one (against relegated Watford), drew four and lost the rest.

This isn’t here to scare you. This isn’t just to show you just how much faith and time the Brighton hierarchy afforded Potter. These five lean spells don’t begin to sum up the scale of transformation Graham Potter undertook at Brighton. In around 3 years, he took them from relegation candidates treating the ball as a sphere of molten lava, to a swashbuckling unit that basked in its light and played illuminating football with it. What was crucial to Potter’s success - apart from his players, his staff, his tactics - was the invaluable gift of time. There were major struggles along the way. At one point, the Brighton fans booed him too, but persistence and perseverance bore fruit in the end. What Potter has consistently offered over his career, is building a cohesive unit invested physically and mentally towards playing an exciting yet pragmatic brand of football. His sides defend from the front, attack from the back and try to find the right notes of harmony in terms of developing into an unpredictable and fierce team. There is a lot to work on yet, but this is, after all, a long term project.

If Boehly and co. stick with their new manager through a period of extensive transition, there will be long-term benefits, as long as the players buy into his thinking. But if the hierarchy scuttles the ship at the first eleven game lean spell, the new dawn will feel all too familiar to the days past.